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ABStrAct
African policy makers find themselves confronted by a phenomenon of rising substance use par-
ticularly in urban areas. The knowledge base in terms of prevalence rates, medical consequences, 
patterns and cultures of consumption remains patchy. Responses are largely driven by imported 
models advocated by drug control agencies and development partners. There are two inherent 
flaws to this – first, many of the methods from treatment modalities to drug enforcement tech-
niques were designed for completely different social and cultural scenarios. Secondly, the mode of 
operation is that of a ‘war on drugs’, where the problem is inherent to the drug itself. The conse-
quences of such a policy can be even more devastating than the drug use itself. The harm reduction 
paradigm that takes drug use as a fact of modern life, but addresses its problems with regulative 
intervention provides a policy orientation that is more promising. Existing drug cultures – khat, 
kola, iboga – that originated and are unique to Africa should be understood within both traditional 
and quickly evolving modern contexts. A system of regulation should be advocated against vested 
professional and organizational interest.
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introDuction
Far from being a marginal, export activity, 
drug use is becoming a fact of life for many 
African communities, and there is an urgent 
need for discussing what is to be done about it. 
This article argues that African drug experts in 
their policy deliberations have to make careful 
assessments of (i) the history and context of 
drug control legislation, (ii) cultures of drug 
consumption, and (iii) capacity and conse-
quences. All these questions have to be asked 
against the backdrop of another discussion – 
what is the overarching objective of policy. 
While the Single Convention seeks to prevent 
and combat this evil, the purpose of this and 
subsequent control instruments (the 1971 Con-
vention on Psychotropic Drugs, and the 1988 
Convention on Drug Trafficking) according to 
the International Narcotics Control Board is to 
“reduce harm” (INCB, 2003)
For any reader familiar with the ‘harm re-
duction’ debate this is a surprising, though lit-
tle known observation. There is no doubt that 
given the tenor of INCB pronouncements on 
drug policy under the presidency of the Ni-
gerian chemist Philip Emafo this was not to 
be mistaken as an endorsement of methadone 
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maintenance. But it opened up ground for a 
crucial reconciliation between the different 
wings in a polarised debate over the future of 
drug control. Before returning to this, howev-
er, it needs to be recognised that harm reduc-
tion itself has become a term that is politically 
contentious. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) secretary general, 
Antonio Costa, did regrettably concur with the 
view of the US emissary that ‘harm reduction’ 
was sending the wrong message, and ordered 
the term to be deleted from all UNODC docu-
ments.1 During the Bush era harm reduction 
was largely written out of US drug treatment 
provision and research. The National Institute 
on Drug Abuse, an ostensibly scientific insti-
tute bound to the ideal of objectivity, refused 
to publish articles on harm reduction inter-
ventions. The previous chief of the United 
Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP 
– predecessor of UNODC), the Italian crimi-
nologist Pinot Arlacchi accused harm reduc-
tion advocates of acting as a Trojan horse for 
drug legalisation, and his successor has called 
drug policy reformers the “pro-drug lobby”. 
Much of this furore is not directed at the set 
of practices that are normally associated with 
harm reduction, but the underlying philosophi-
cal disposition of ‘living with drugs’ (Gossop, 
2007). The tacit recognition that drug use has 
spiralled since 1961, that the problems of drug 
use are not properly addressed by drug con-
trol policies, and that there is a need for serv-
ice provision for drug users to enhance their 
health and wellbeing without dissuading them 
from their drug use, is seen as an existential 
challenge to some drug control agencies. Yet, 
drug control should always be dictated by the 
needs of public health, not the interests of pro-
fessional groups or ideological dictates. The 
call for policy to be evidence based has to be 
continuously reformulated, because it remains 
in most countries an aspiration at best. 
In Africa too there is the danger of a policy 
formulated by rhetoric, ideology and fear. One 
1 Letter from Antonio Costa to Robert Charles, 
11, November, 2005 http://www.tdpf.org.uk/
MediaNews_LatestNews_25_01_05.htm
former chief of the Nigerian National Drug 
Law Enforcement Agency, Ibrahim Bamayi, 
would pepper his speeches with phrases like 
the ‘scourge of drugs’, ‘immorality’, and the 
‘bane of the young’. Yet as he candidly ad-
mitted, his own knowledge of the subject was 
minimal. “I was not appointed to head the 
NDLEA because of my knowledge of drugs, 
but because of my leadership” he once said in 
a conversation with the author. These hopes 
were well rewarded, after the agency was 
overhauled, one third of its operatives sacked 
and professional standards much improved. 
Yet the approach taken was one of militariza-
tion, with roadblocks, attacks on villages with 
marijuana farms, and gruesome interrogation 
methods of suspects. The general had taken 
the ‘war on drugs’ literally and launched a cru-
sade that earned him the accolade “the fear of 
Bamayi is the beginning of wisdom.”
The Nigerian experience raises the many 
problems of drug control in countries where 
experience is shallow, resources scarce and 
information patchy. Working at the hard end 
of drug law enforcement, agencies and policy 
makers are tempted to import solutions prof-
fered by development partners. Yet in spite of 
regular lip service to adapting policies to local 
needs, some of the key players – the US Drug 
Enforcement Administration, the UNODC and 
European Commission – continue to subsume 
national particularity to universal drug con-
trol principles. Clichéd phrases, like not re-
inventing the wheel, are often used to justify 
this knowledge transfer, but they also ignore 
what one member of the Mini-Dublin group2 
in Lagos said in a candid moment during a 
meeting in 1999– “there is little that Europe or 
the Americans can celebrate when it comes to 
drug control.” 
If there are indeed no models of how to suc-
cessfully contain drug use at an acceptable 
cost, we can still draw some lessons: (i) that 
2 In most drug producing and transit countries 
law enforcement agents and diplomatic staff 
from developed countries meet to exchange 
information in an informal setting known as 
the Mini Dublin Group 
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there are severe limitations of what policy can 
achieve in the containing and controlling of 
human behaviour, (ii) the need for clear policy 
objectives, and (iii) the urgency of well in-
formed debate. 
Alcohol AnD the hiStorY 
AnD conteXt of Drug 
control legiSlAtion 
In that spirit, I would like to propose that the 
first thing that is required is a sense of origin 
of drug control in Africa. The point needs to 
be stressed that African governments inherited 
drug control legislation at independence from 
the former colonial administrations. These 
were designed either in the spirit of benign 
paternalism, or mere extensions of metropoli-
tan legislation. Important for the discussion is 
therefore the regulation of Europe’s favourite 
drug – alcohol. 
From the 17th to the 19th century, alcohol 
like rum, gin, and brandy were important trade 
items in the Atlantic trading triangle. Yet while 
European merchants had been happy to ply Af-
ricans with hard liquor, and colonial adminis-
trators depended on revenue from alcohol and 
tobacco taxes, colonial policy became ever 
more disapproving (Akyeampong, 1997; Pan, 
1975). Prohibitions on liquor sales to African 
subjects were introduced across the continent. 
Some of the best known examples are from 
white settler colonies in Southern and Eastern 
Africa where beer halls were located outside 
settlements to prevent social protest (Ambler 
1990). The 1892 Brussels General Act, the 
outcome of the two year conference of Euro-
pean powers engaging in the process of carv-
ing up the African continent, provided the first 
instance of a drug control regime established 
by international agreement. The effect of these 
restrictions on the importation of alcohol was 
to stimulate African production, a case study 
in import substitution. 
While the brewing of different beers and 
the fermentation of wines, particularly from 
the palm tree, is historically recorded as an an-
cient tradition, the technique of distilling was 
established in the late 19th century. It quickly 
became an important cottage industry, particu-
larly for urban women. The challenges that the 
relatively sudden availability of home distilled 
and relatively low priced liquors posed to the 
traditional assumptions about its proper use are 
well documented (Akyeampong, 1997). Social 
tensions along the lines of age and gender, key 
organising principles in African (and any) 
society, were subverted by the market. Many 
traditionalists who saw access to alcohol as a 
privilege of age rather than a prerogative of 
purchasing power regarded the availability of 
alcohol to young men as a grave offence to the 
proper order of things. In East Africa the alarm 
caused by alcohol was “a question of the age 
and gender of the drinker; and the absence or 
presence of particular categories of persons….
it was ‘joint drinking’ which challenged ideas 
of propriety” (Willis, 2002). There was equal 
concern over the role played by women, but 
this has once again been explained as stem-
ming from the perceived financial independ-
ence of distillers, which was in essence no 
different from the financial independence of 
other market women. 
With independence legislative arrangements 
were normalised, and brewers and distillers 
led the way in the industrial processing sector. 
But concerns over the commercialisation of al-
cohol remained, as had happened in earlier in 
Europe. The Ugandan informants interviewed 
by Willis, for instance, lament that people do 
not drink like they used to, that the alcohol is 
stronger and more widely available, and that 
people tend to misbehave. 
Colonial authorities applied a system of 
multiple standards, where white settlers and 
merchants had free access to range of bever-
ages deemed too dangerous for natives, who 
according to a British delegate at the Brus-
sels conference ‘knew no moderation’ (Klein, 
1999). However, the drug control legislation 
introduced from the 1930s onwards intro-
duced blanket bans. Only opium and cocaine, 
two of the substances that were brought un-
der control, were largely unknown in Africa. 
Legislation had little to do with local need, 
and everything to do with the obligations of 
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the metropolitan country to the League of 
Nations that had organised the drug control 
conventions. In successive conferences held 
at Geneva in 1920, 1925, 1928 and 1931, the 
restrictions on the production and distribution 
of these three plant-based substances grew 
ever tighter. While the League was blown 
apart by the Second World War it re-emerged 
in the shape of the United Nations in 1946. It 
is a little known fact that drug control was one 
of its immediate concerns, and an area where 
the organisation could play an influential part 
and align itself with the foreign policy outlook 
of it most powerful member, the USA. Drug 
control proved a rare instance of super power 
accord, and all three conventions enjoyed sup-
port from the General Assembly. 
Though the US government supported erad-
ication measures in countries as diverse as Ja-
maica, Belize, Mexico and Thailand at an ear-
ly date, drug control was primarily a domestic 
and law enforcement issue until the 1990s. In 
the following decades, in the absence of state 
level rivalry, security agencies began identify-
ing non-state actors as threats to national se-
curity (Andreas and Nadelman, 2007; Klein, 
2008; Feiling, 2009). Throughout the 1990s 
the US Drug Enforcement Administration 
sharply accelerated its programme of build-
ing operational bases across the continent, to 
gather intelligence, pressurize African govern-
ments, and provide training and equipment to 
selected partner agencies. At a different level 
the European Commission, emerging as the 
largest single donor agency, included acces-
sion to the three UN drug conventions as an 
aid conditionality. To be eligible for develop-
ment assistance countries had to introduce leg-
islation that criminalised drug production and 
use even where these were part of a well estab-
lished tradition. Given that most policy mak-
ers have little interest in and knowledge about 
drug policy, they find it easy to agree on some 
global principle that drugs are deleterious to 
the well being of the young, and have no clear 
understanding of the unintended consequence 
of a drug control programme. Across Africa the 
passage of drug control measures into national 
legislations has proceeded apace over the past 
twenty years, accompanied by the passage of 
so called Drug Master Plans. In the Southern 
African Development Community, European 
development funds have prompted the draft-
ing of a SADC Drug Protocol. The reasoning 
is that drug trafficking undermines governance 
by fostering corruption. This is only partially 
correct, as traffickers are only in the business 
because of the combined factors of powerful 
market demand and strict prohibitions. The 
Drug Master Plans that are drafted with as-
sistance by the UNODC are rarely a planning 
instrument for national governments as most 
of the listed activities remain on paper only. 
They are at best aspirational statements, that 
are not owned by the governments in whose 
name they are published.
For the most part then, drug policies in Af-
rica are a response to external pressure – by 
US and European government agencies, and 
by the appearance of drugs and traffickers 
from abroad. Yet the implications of drug con-
trol policy go well beyond the crack down on 
white powders flowing in from Latin America 
and the Far East.
trADitionS of  
non-Alcoholic Drug 
conSuMPtion in AfricA
According to the UNODC, traditional pat-
terns of use should be exempt from prohibition-
ist interventions, provided that these are regu-
lated by tradition and phased out for younger 
generations (UNDCP, 1997). What exactly 
constitutes ‘traditional’ drug use does remain 
contested, given the preponderance of an ideol-
ogy based policy-making approach in this field. 
My second contention is therefore that recogni-
tion be given to evidence of traditional use, and 
particularly the scholarly work on historical and 
contemporary patterns of drug use. We can start 
by tracing the century old history of cannabis 
use in many parts of Eastern and Southern Af-
rica, documented in the magisterial work by du 
Toit (1980). Though this scholarship suggests 
diffusion from India, there is no doubt that over 
several centuries the herb became accultur-
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ated. Among many different population seg-
ments, including the Twa in Rwanda, cannabis 
use has become integrated and normalised. He 
further describes the use of cannabis by Zulu, 
Sotho and Swazi warriors to build up courage 
and suppress scruple, a tradition that is report-
edly continued by soldiers across the continent 
today. There are further reports of medical ap-
plication, for example during child-birth. It is 
reported that in many sub-groups cannabis use 
is seen as normal and adaptive behaviour.
What is more controversial is how cannabis 
use has been spreading over the past fifty years 
to areas where it was hitherto unknown, par-
ticularly in West Africa. More complex still is 
the question of how the use of cannabis and all 
other psychoactive substances have taken hold 
in the fast growing African cities. The proviso 
that ‘traditional use’ be acceptable is difficult 
to transfer to the entirely different environ-
ment of the modern city. Yet it is precisely in 
the urban context that drug use is taking off 
in Africa, as it is in other regions, and has of 
course in European history.
Urbanisation has been proceeding at break-
neck speed across the continent. A majority 
of people are now living in cities lacking in 
many basic services, including the rarely con-
sidered need for entertainment and the build-
ing of community, two areas where substance 
use comes to the fore. The need for leisure and 
pleasure where people can relax, and where 
the community of strangers can mix across 
ethnic boundaries and social distinctions, is 
well served by the provision of locally pro-
duced vegetable based drug products of mod-
erate potency (Klein and Beckerleg, 2007). 
Given their international treaty obligations, 
African government may have to tread softly 
when licensing cannabis cafes similar to the 
coffee shops found in the Netherlands, or the 
Medical Marijuana cooperatives of California, 
though both provide a model worth exploring. 
Less contentious but equally challenging is the 
regulation of drugs that are culturally embed-
ded in particular regions where they are rarely 
recognised as drugs, but are spreading to new 
areas. There are three of these cultural com-
plexes of significance in Africa.
(i) the khat belt
Historically khat consumption was confined 
to the areas of khat production, because of the 
instability of the psychoactive alkaloids con-
tained in the leaves of the shrub. These leafs 
are harvested, collected into bundles some 
200-300 grams in weight, and chewed in regu-
lar chewing sessions held in private houses, or 
increasingly in mafrishes3 or khat cafes. Until 
the introduction of road, rail and air transport, 
which have facilitated the emergence of khat 
as a global commodity, its use was confined 
to parts of Ethiopia, the Meru mountains of 
Kenya and the highlands of northern Somalia 
(Klein, 2009). Historical sources report a well 
regulated pattern of consumption in urban ar-
eal like Harar (Anderson et al., 2007), and the 
integration of khat chewing into the rhythm of 
life in rural areas (Gebissa, 2004). Khat is best 
described as a stimulant that has little impact 
on the well being of the chewer when used in 
moderation. And yet, there is growing concern 
in Ethiopia and Kenya over the spread of khat 
to areas where it was hitherto unknown and to 
new groups of users like students. Even more 
contentious is the spread of khat use to coun-
tries inside and outside Africa where there is 
no history of consumption at all. Some, like 
Uganda, are deliberating over the pros and 
cons of this phenomenon, while others like 
Rwanda and Tanzania have taken a prohibi-
tionist approach.
(ii) Kola nut
This caffeine containing nut is chewed 
with enthusiasm in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ni-
ger, Nigeria, and Mali, where it provides for 
the vertical integration of forest and savan-
nah (Lovejoy, 1985). At the risk of generali-
sation, one can record a marked difference in 
the pattern of consumption that has emerged 
between these two ecological regions. While 
southern consumers integrate kola in rituals 
of hospitality as a religious offering, or in a 
more profane context, combine it with alcohol 
3 From the Arabic; as Beckerleg notes, Yemenis 




when socialising, northern kola chewers dis-
play more extensive patterns of use. Northern 
Nigeria and Ghana are predominantly Muslim, 
and most people abstain from alcohol, leaving 
kola as “one of the few stimulants permitted 
by the Koran” (Abaka, 2005). The long term 
consequences of heavy kola use are particu-
larly evident in poor oral health, but also in 
symptoms of self neglect, the prioritisation of 
kola use over other activities, and the central 
importance that kola use has in the lives of 
regular chewers. These are all symptoms of 
addiction listed by the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases (ICD-10), yet the only coun-
try that has recognised the risk of immoderate 
kola use is Saudi Arabia where it is classified 
as a controlled drug. For the time being Af-
rican governments are more concerned about 
the missed opportunity of turning kola into 
an export commodity, but the implications of 
heavy use and the extensification of use will 
require a response in the future.
(iii) iboga
The only recorded instance of the use of 
heavy hallucinogens in Africa is the Bwiti cult 
found in Cameroon and Congo Brazzaville. 
This most powerful of substances is gained 
from root bark bark shaved off the iboga tree, 
used for visionary purpose. Members of the 
cult ingest varying dosages of the bark be-
fore embarking on a spiritual journey that 
takes place over several days. Accompanied 
by attendants from the cult, they engage in 
different ritual tasks all designed to help with 
the processing and interpretation of the pow-
erful visionary and auditory hallucinations 
brought about by the psychoactive ibogaine. 
Strong doses are taken only on occasion by 
most adepts of the cult, and involve a pain-
ful ordeal of stomach cramps, vomiting, and 
the loss of physical control. There are regu-
lar cases of overdoses when administered 
inexpertly (Fernandez, 1982). The Bwiti cult 
strongly disapproves of iboga consumption 
outside the context of ritual, and there is little 
information about ‘recreational’ use. Given 
the strong physical reaction to iboga – fevers, 
sweating, and intense vomiting – it is an un-
likely candidate for extensive use. In recent 
years Ibogaine has been promoted as a treat-
ment for drug and alcohol addiction. (Brack-
enbridge, 2010)
One of the regular refrains in the drug 
policy field is that there is not enough infor-
mation for policy makers to move forward. 
This needs to be contested, as information 
abounds, but policy makers are either una-
ware, or reluctant to take note of politically 
controversial findings. When it comes to Af-
rican drugs, information exists for the discus-
sion to commence, but we need to update the 
picture on trends and developments. Critical-
ly, African drugs tend to stay off the radar as 
long as they remain confined to the continent, 
but once drug and drug habit are exported 
to Europe and North America they become 
a policy issue, as in the case of khat (Klein, 
2009). Then decisions on the classification 
of substances with origin and distribution 
in Africa are taken to an international level, 
in fora where African policy makers and ex-
perts have little influence. A parallel example 
would be the classification of the coca leaf 
in the 1961 drug convention. Coca leaves are 
widely chewed across the Andes and have 
been part of a culture of consumption reach-
ing back well before the pre-Columbian era. 
Yet the decision to class coca as a drug and 
agree on the elimination of use and the eradi-
cation of production was reached without 
consultation of farmers, users and traders, 
contributing to social unrest and instability 
that has plagued Bolivia, Peru and Colombia 
for the past thirty years (TNI, 2003). There is 
an urgent need for a good understanding of 
drugs and drug use in Africa to provide the 
background for policy discussion. This starts 
with the awareness that these drugs form a 
part of the cultural fabric of different socie-
ties, that there are spiritual as well as recrea-
tional uses, and that the cultural context in 
which drug use has already been normalised 
is dynamic and adaptable. The multiple ques-
tions of what drugs are about, who uses them, 
what should be the distinction of problematic 
and non problematic use, need to be given 




In terms of drug control one question that is 
never explored is what governments are actu-
ally capable of achieving. There is little point 
in passing legislation impossible to enforce or 
policies that cannot be implemented, as this 
only serves to bring the government into dis-
repute. The capacity of many African states is 
stretched already. Adding new responsibilities 
such as eradication domestic cannabis pro-
duction without a thorough assessment of re-
sources and capacities runs the risk of being 
counterproductive. 
It is important to be very clear about the risk 
of unintended consequence in the drugs control 
field where the state moves to proscribe and 
prohibit certain forms of behaviour engaged in 
by sections of its own citizens. These are pat-
terns of behaviour that are consensual and do 
not involve third parties. When the state inter-
feres it has to work on the Hippocratic principle 
of first of all, doing no harm. It is arguable that 
a drug user stands to suffer far greater harm 
from arrest, interrogation, imprisonment and a 
criminal record than he or she would have from 
the use of the drug. A further consideration has 
to be that “one of the most pernicious and of-
ten forgotten side effects of prohibition is cor-
ruption. Illegal vice and police graft are two 
sides of the same coin” (Legget, 2002). Drug 
control legislation in societies where there is 
continuous demand for drugs has the potential 
to corrode the entire criminal justice system. 
At the street level patrolling police officers can 
hold up drug users and extort bribes; they can 
plant drugs on people for the same purpose as 
reported from Nigeria (Klein, 1999). At higher 
levels, senior officers can shield drug traffick-
ers or even become involved in the trade itself. 
Bribes, often accompanied by violent threats, 
sway judges and prison officers. And the re-
alisation of these practices quickly spreads, 
undermining the legitimacy of the government 
and the stability of the regime.
Corruption is dogging drug enforcement the 
world over, as the UNODC recognise Interna-
tional drug control has produced several unin-
tended consequences, the most formidable of 
which is the creation of a lucrative black mar-
ket for controlled substances, and the violence 
and corruption it generates.” But the corrosion 
of governance hits particularly hard where 
remuneration of law enforcement is low, su-
pervision poor, and the capacity for internal 
reform is limited. By institutionalising rogue 
behaviour among front line officers, an unen-
forceable drug control law turns its objective 
of promoting law and order on its head. Once 
links between organised crime and senior of-
ficers have been made, a dangerous momen-
tum is put into play that makes reform difficult 
and costly.
hArM reDuction AS the 
oVerriDing PolicY PrinciPle
Most areas of life are ridden by the ten-
sions between general principles, formulated 
with reference to universal rights and absolute 
values, and their application in the realm of 
practice. Nowhere is this more clearly in evi-
dence than in the field of drug policy, where 
a system of restrictions, controls and punish-
ments has been set up by international agree-
ment to prevent the production, distribution 
and consumption of certain substances unless 
specifically authorized by government author-
ity for medical or research purposes. Behind 
these prohibitions lie the best of intentions 
as laid out in the preamble to the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on drugs.4 The treaty is 
“Concerned with the health and welfare of 
mankind” about the dangers of addiction to 
narcotic drugs and therefore imposes control 
on their availability as part of the signato-
ries’ “duty to prevent and combat this evil.” 
Since it came into force nearly half a century 
ago, over 140 countries have acceded to the 
treaty and brought tough drug control legisla-
4 The Single Act was an amalgamation of sev-
eral drug control treaties that had been devel-
oped under the auspices of the League of Na-
tions during the 1920s and 30s. We can trace 
these drug control efforts back to the first in-
ternational meeting at Shanghai in 1909.
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tion onto their statute books. Yet the dispirit-
ing reality is that in spite of these efforts drug 
use, far from becoming controlled has been 
expanding radically.5 
Over ten years ago the UNDCP6 published 
a study on drugs in Africa, where the continent 
was referred to as drug control’s ‘last frontier’. 
Following in the geographic determination of 
that report, this article will address Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, leaving the discussion of North 
Africa for another time. Since then, successive 
World Drug Reports have reported that the use 
of illicit substances has been rising sharply in 
many African countries, at the very time as 
trends were stabilising in Europe and falling in 
the US. For many policy makers these reports 
came as wake up call, as they had regarded 
drug use as a symptom of developed country 
decadence from which Africa, for all its pover-
ty, remained immune. One group of members 
of the Nigerian National Assembly, freshly 
convened after the return to civilian govern-
ment in 1999, told the author that the traffick-
ing syndicates making use of Nigerian airports 
to ship cocaine and heroin into Europe were no 
major concern of theirs. If Europeans wanted 
to import these substances and kill themselves 
let that be their problem, why should Nigeria 
invest precious resources to control this traffic. 
Such a disconnect from trends in the popula-
tion is sadly reminiscent of the failure by Af-
rican health researchers and epidemiologists 
to register the spread of HIV/AIDS during the 
1980s. In this case too, cultural preconcep-
tions overrode scientific evidence, as observed 
by James Chin, who ran a modelling seminar 
in Swaziland with leading African experts at a 
time when many participants rejected the pos-
5 Indeed in countries like the UK, where data on 
drug related deaths has been collected since 
the founding of the National Registrar in 1837 
(Berridge and Griffiths, 1987), the tally has 
moved from a few hundred, to 3,301 in 2005 
(Corkery, 2008). Different definitions on ‘drug 
related death’ compete – the figure cited was 
compiled by the Office for National Statistics
6 The United Nations Drug Control Programme 
changed its name to United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime in 2004.
sibility of an impending crisis, because AIDS 
was a western disease of homosexual and drug 
addicts (Chin 2007). 
Considering the three salient features of 
drug use in Africa, (i) the history and context 
of drug control legislation, (ii) existing cul-
tures of drug consumption, and (iii) the capac-
ities of government institutions shaping drug 
control legislation’s consequences for these 
institutions, harm reduction should be the 
overarching policy principle for African drug 
policy. It is based on the recognition that drugs 
play a part in most societies and that there are 
definite problems associated with certain pat-
terns of use. The objective of policy is to use 
the various instruments at its disposal to re-
duce the risk of suffering harm to its citizens. 
Curtailing the influx of dangerous substances 
is as much a part of that as treatment for those 
whose pattern of use has slipped out of control. 
Whatever the policy mix, it has to be governed 
by the ideal of reducing risk and harm to the 
largest number of people. 
The practices that are bundled together 
under the label ‘harm reduction’ and used in 
many different countries are not necessarily 
all applicable to African countries. The preva-
lence of injecting needle use reported in the 
last, continent wide Rapid Assessment Study 
by the UNDCP UNDCP, 1998) was low. Since 
then, there have been dramatic changes in drug 
use behaviour. It seems that African countries, 
led by Mauritius are fast catching up with oth-
er parts of the world (Abdool et al., 2006). In 
addition, there is a high risk of hospital based 
infections, as exposure to small volumes of 
blood on unsterile instruments reused for in-
vasive medical procedures is common, and 
critically understudied. Indeed, “ Many AIDS 
prevention programs in Africa have set aside 
injection risks in their communications with 
the public, perceiving IDU as uncommon…. 
Africa’s growing population of IDU are, in 
some communities, largely unaware that shar-
ing needles carries a risk of transmitting HIV” 
(Reid, 2009).
 Much of harm reduction is concerned with 
reducing the risks of needle injecting of which 
only sporadic incidence is reported from 
KLEIN
67
Africa so far (Beckerleg, 1995; Deveau et al., 
2006, Needle et al., 1996). On the other hand, 
we have good information on the risks run by 
governments that reject harm reduction for 
ideological reasons. Russia has refused to con-
sider needle exchange programs or methadone 
maintenance, and now has a population of over 
1 million people living with HIV or AIDS. The 
main vector for infection is the sharing or in-
jection equipment, often inside the prison sys-
tem. Predictably, infection rates have crossed 
over into the non-drug using population via 
sexual intercourse There are early indication 
that this pattern of infection is about to repeat 
itself in Africa (Reid, 2009).
The warning signs are clear for all gov-
ernments: intervention in human behaviour 
comes at a high price, and the consequences 
can be devastating. They impact the health of 
the people and the integrity of affected institu-
tions. Many of the international agencies spe-
cialising in drug control point out these risks. 
Drug prohibitions pushes users into adopting 
more dangerous practices – stronger drugs re-
place moderate drugs, consumption moves to 
riskier settings where social controls are weak, 
and more dangerous modes of administration 
(smoking crack as opposed to snorting co-
caine; injecting heroin as opposed to smoking 
or eating opium) are adopted. Yet these out-
comes are not factored into control systems. 
Most importantly, the corruption of agencies 
involved in drug control, though well known 
and found in countries across the globe, is sim-
ply ignored by agencies like the International 
Narcotic Control Board.
Fortunately there is a rising body of knowl-
edge not only about drugs and drug use, but 
also about drug policy and its impact. We have 
a better understanding of the efficacy of the 
drug programmes employed in different coun-
tries and can learn from over thirty years of 
waging a war on drugs. With the head of the 
US Office of National Drug Policy redirect-
ing drug policy from war towards treatment, 
and with the directive by the Obama adminis-
tration that the closure of Medical Marijuana 
centres is no longer a priority for law enforce-
ment, we see a shift in approach among one of 
the world’s leading advocates of drug control. 
How this will play out in the mid term remains 
to be seen given the vested interests in the sta-
tus quo. For Africa, the situation is at a differ-
ent point. 
Much of the international attention focuses 
on African countries as transit route for cocaine 
and heroin. This is neither new (Klein 1994), 
nor is it of major significance for drug markets 
in either Africa or importing countries. Howev-
er alarming the shipment of cocaine via Guinea 
Bissau may appear to some commentators, 
closing down this route will not impact dramat-
ically on European cocaine markets. There are 
simply too many alternative routes, and a host 
of amphetamine producers on stand by to fill in 
any temporary shortage. While the efforts by 
UNODC to support governance in West Africa 
are well intended they obscure the origin of the 
problem. African countries are victims of the 
‘sausage effect’, where the closure of one traf-
ficking route simply re-opens another. In this 
case, cocaine exporting cartels have relocated 
from the Caribbean to West Africa, with a raft 
of consequences for local law enforcement and 
property prices (UNODC, 2009).
What should be more important for African 
countries in the long term is finding a frame-
work for the regulation of all psychoactive sub-
stances. This should take account of traditional 
substances like kola nut, khat, iboga, cannabis, 
and alcohol, as well as tobacco, prescription 
medicines and the new substances like cocaine 
and heroin. It may well be possible to enforce 
prohibitions on the latter as long as markets 
are tiny and the product is imported. But 
when it comes to plant based substances that 
are locally grown and sold, policy has to be 
governed by realism – what can be achieved. 
We therefore suggest that the idea of harm re-
duction become the overarching policy princi-
ple, with the clearly stated aim to contain the 
harm caused by all psychoactive drugs. Given 
the failure of the war on drugs in many other 
parts of the world, the risks of inappropriate 
interventions to the fabric of government, and 
the danger of unintended consequences, this 
seems to be the most promising foundation for 
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